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The Further Misadventures of Warmed-Over Natural Law Arguments

I’ve spent some time going through the amicus appellate brief filed by Robert P. George et al. in the Prop 8 case. In a couple of pieces I posted a few months ago, I criticized George’s warmed-over natural law ideas, which amount to little more than convenient sophistry in defense of his preferred outcomes (including the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from marriage.)

Nonetheless, this short and pointed amicus brief is clear and effective on its central point: We need a definition of marriage, and that definition has to be provided by the legislature (or, in the case of Prop 8, by the people). Without such a definition, everyone has a claim to be included, and there’s no legitimate basis for excluding other sorts of unions, including polygamous ones or relations between adult kin. And this definition inescapably takes in a moral dimension, as it inevitably must: What are we signaling with marriage? What is its normative, prescriptive content?

But it’s a long way from asking those vital questions to getting the answers that George et al. hope the appellate court to reach, and the argument simply doesn’t hold together. First, it’s too simple to state, as the authors do, that we have a clear definition of marriage to start (“logically prior,” as they say) and that we can then raise constitutional issues only in the context of that agreed-upon definition.

By that clinical way of considering the issue, we’d rarely be able to declare the exclusion of any group unconstitutional. So if marriage really is tied to procreation and the best interests of children (as the authors state, but in a more sophisticated way than usual), then it presumably would be constitutionally permissible to exclude women over a certain age (say, 65 for women; by the logic of this argument, we wouldn’t care about the sex discrimination involved). The authors attempt to avoid this conclusion by pointing to the natural-law-heavy assertion that men and women unite in a unique way, but why is that union important to marriage if it can’t produce children (since marriage is, again, mostly about children)? In the end, George’s natural law biases return to their moorings.

No, it’s more complicated than that: The meanings (not meaning, singular) of marriage are complex,  and subject to constant reconstruction and challenge, especially at certain watershed moments. We’re in one now. And it’s fair to say, as the authors do, that the political process has a role to play in this on-going definitional process; to that extent, the marriage equality debate has been useful to a collective consideration of the broader questions about the purposes and meanings of marriage.

But that doesn’t mean that the courts have no role to play in ensuring that those definitions are not crafted in a way that ensures the unequal treatment of certain groups of people. And, as it turns, out, the supposed clarity that George et al. find in the purpose of marriage is really just a convenient way to fence out same-sex couples. It’s obvious from what they don’t say. For example, they overlook the inconvenient fact that adult friends can marry, as long as they’re of the opposite sex. But surely such non-procreative, non-sexual unions are inimical to the purposes of marriage, as they’ve defined them. Why don’t they “weaken the links between marriage and procreation,” which the authors fear that sanctioning same-sex marriages would do?

This brief is better than most on the anti-equality side, principally because it clinically eviscerates the argument that the state should stay out of morality in creating marriage laws. Doing so would be impossible, perhaps even incoherent. But its own positive arguments for morality stand revealed as just another way to define marriage to exclude same-sex couples only – not the old, the infertile, or the non-sexual.

I’m not done. The authors also simply assert that extending marriage to same-sex couples would “convey that marriage is fundamentally about adults’ emotional unions – not bodily union or children….”

Really? As for “bodily unions,” we can see the natural law argument peeking through – and this same argument would, by the way, exclude deliberately non-procreative sexual relations between opposite-sex, married people, as well as all sex between a “whole” and a seriously disabled person (who lacks not only procreative capacity but the “equipment” needed for the task); the latter, according to their theory, shouldn’t be allowed to marry, either. But don’t expect to hear them arguing against such unions – unless the couple also happens to be gay.

As for children, we have yet another case of the anti-equality forces completely overlooking the welfare of the children in families headed by same-sex couples. But these authors go further, and overlook the very existence of these children – after all, the union of their parents is about their “emotions,” not about their kids. It’s quite apparent that none of the authors has spent any time around our families.

In short, there’s no principled way of excluding only our unions from the right to marry. It’s precisely for that reason that courts have come to recognize that what really lies at the bottom of the opposition is a kind of natural law argument that, on the most basic level, reduces to: “Ick!”

  1. September 28th, 2010 at 12:44 | #1

    Is this updated? If not, is there an update?

  2. September 29th, 2010 at 00:10 | #2

    No, but the post was crossed over to Prop8 Trial Tracker, where there are dozens of comments you might find interesting. url:

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